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NOTES
ON LEMON SQuEEzERs AND LOCKING DEVICES:
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY AND FIREARMS,
A MODEST PROPOSAL
INTRODUCTION
A. Why Buy a Firearm? Intended Uses, Unintended Consequences
In 1971 officials at Detroit General Hospital noticed that the
number of children admitted to their care with firearm injuries had
increased. In an attempt to find a reason for that increase the
hospital began an investigation. They discovered that both gunshot
wounds and accidental firearm fatalities among children had in-
creased along with the number of firearm permits. Immediately
following the Detroit Riots of 1967 law enforcement officials in
Detroit had issued three times as many firearm permits as before.
The term firearm encompasses "weapon[s] from which a shot
is discharged by gunpowder."2 The United States Code broadly
defines a firearm as a shotgun, rifle, machine gun, destructive
device, or concealable weapon from which a shot can be dis-
charged through the energy of an explosive.3 Outside of the mili-
tary and law enforcement, these weapons serve three legitimate
purposes: sport, collection, and self-defense.4 Variations of use
1. See Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365, 1386-87
(1993).
2. WasamR's THID NEW IWNTRNATIONAL DICTIONARY 854 (1986).
3. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)-(f) (1994). For more detailed definitions of these types of
firearms, see 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1994).
4. This is not to minimize the fact that firearms may be purchased for misuse (i.e.,
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within these general categories provide insight into the place fire-
arms occupy in American culture:
Hunters ... view their guns as a way to escape the "stop-
light and concrete jungle." Target shooters emphasize the
calmness, the discipline, the self-control involved in shoot-
ing. Devotees of much reviled assault rifles are drawn to
the technology and the brute impact of these weapons.
Collectors see beauty and craftsmanship .... [M]illions of
Americans ... keep guns for self-protection.... Some
gun owners see their weapons as foils to government tyran-
ny
The need served by a particular firearm, however, does not
limit the potential uses of that firearm. The design of a shotgun is
useful for both hunting and homicide.' The brute impact delivered
by an assault weapon on the shooting range translates into broken
bodies and lost lives in the hands of a troubled adolescent.7 The
handgun kept in the dresser drawer that brings a sense of security
to home and family can destroy that family when discovered by a
curious child or a depressed teen.
suicide, murder, and other crimes). As these potential misuses are defined by the intent of
the owner of the firearm, they are not likely to be avoided by child-resistant or personal-
ized firearms. Thus, strategies for preventing these misuses are beyond the scope of this
Note.
5. Donald Baer et al., Guns, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 8, 1989, at 20, 22.
For an insight into the thinking of individuals and groups who possess weapons primarily
out of fear of government, see Daniel Vol], The Right to Bear Sorrow; Gun Control
Opponents and Accidental Shootings, ESQUIRE, Mar. 1995, at 79, 79-82 (interviewing
members of Florida and Montana militia groups).
6. See, e.g., David Beard, Death of a Secret, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Oct.
20, 1995, at Al (detailing the story of a man who confessed after 15 years to using a
shotgun to kill his parents in order to claim his inheritance).
7. See, e.g., ERIK LARSON, LLAL PASSAGE: How THE TRAVELS OF A SINGLE
HANDGUN ExPOSE THE ROom OF AMERICA'S GUN CRISIS (1994) (telling the story of a
16-year-old Virginia boy who acquired a semi-automatic handgun and used it to kill one
of his teachers and gravely wound another).
8. See Steve Jensen, Charges Dropped in Fatal Shooting, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan.
31, 1996, at B5 (reporting why charges were dropped against the mother of an eight-
year-old who shot his six-year-old brother. The boys were looking for candy in their
mother's room when they found a loaded .38-caliber revolver on the dresser); Ira Berkow,
An Athlete Is Dead at 17 and No One Can Say Why, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1995, § 8 at
1 (reporting on the suicide of a seemingly untroubled high school athlete in Lewiston,
Maine, who shot himself with his father's .22 caliber handgun).
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B. Issue
This Note argues for the improvement of firearm safety
through the implementation of a federally mandated performance
standard requiring that all firearms are personalized and child-resis-
tant. This argument is founded on four premises. First, firearms are
unsafe as currently manufactured and designed. Second, greater
safety can be achieved by implementing performance standards.
Third, mandatory performance standards are most effective when
implemented at the federal level. Fourth, personalization and child-
resistance are feasible performance standards that will improve
firearm safety.
Part L.A supports these claims by detailing the presence of
firearms in American society. The market for firearms is analyzed
in terms of supply, distribution, and demand. Part I.B argues that
firearms are unsafe as currently designed, and details the extent of
the unintended use of firearms by unintended users: children, ado-
lescents, and criminals. Part I.C describes the regulatory environ-
ment of firearms, outlining existing regulations at all levels of
government, and discusses common law remedies available within
the products liability scheme. Industry efforts to increase firearm
safety are also highlighted. Part I.D provides an analysis of federal
product safety regulation via a description of the Consumer Product
Safety Act ("CPSA") and the authority it grants to the Consumer
Product Safety Commission ("Commission").
The analysis begins in Part II.A with an introduction to the
context and method of the argument. Part II.B describes the spe-
cific details of the child-resistance and personalization proposal and
suggests two possible means of implementation. Part II.C analyzes
this proposal within the framework of the findings required by the
CPSA. Part II.D gives further consideration to the major challenges
facing such a proposal.
This Note concludes that child-resistance and personalization
should be required functions of each and every firearm, that those
functions should be mandated within the existing federal regulatory
scheme, and that if those functions were implemented they would
begin to reduce the excessive costs associated with unintended
firearm misuse.
9811997]
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I. BACKGROUND: FIREARMS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
A. The Quantity of Firearms in American Society
1. Production: The Supply of Firearms
It is generally asserted that there are 200 million firearms cir-
culating within the United States.9 This number, however, is ex-
tremely difficult to verify.1" One reason for this is that the federal
regulatory system does not include a uniform system of firearm
registration." Another difficulty is that the usable life of a firearm
is extremely long. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York
has noted that "the life of a handgun seems to be measured in
decades, generations, and even centuries."' 2 Because of these pro-
blems it is necessary to study a half-century of firearm production,
imports, and exports to get a realistic perspective of the number in
circulation.
There are about 1,200 firearm manufacturers in the United
States.' 3 Most firearm production occurs in Massachusetts or Con-
necticut in an area known as "Gun Valley."'14 Reliable records of
9. See Wayne H. Wink, Jr., Biting the Bullet: Two Proposals to Stem the Tide of
Gun Violence, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 235, 238 n.20 (1994); Jonathan I.
Groner, Does the Violence Stop This Way? PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 11, 1995, at
9B; Linnet Myers, Swiss Live with Guns, But We Can't: Murder Rates in U.S. Far Ex-
ceed Europe's, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1995, at A14; Dan Walters, Attacking the Wrong
Factor, SAcRAMENTo BEE, Aug. 22, 1995, at A3.
10. See Kurt F. Kluin, Note, Gun Control: Is it a Legal and Effective Means of Con-
trolling Firearms in the United States? 21 WASHBURN LJ., 254, 255 n.92 (1982) (citing
a 1975 study reporting 90 to 200 million firearms in circulation, a 1976 study reporting
136 million, and a 1979 study reporting 210 to 220 million).
11. See infra notes 122-39 and accompanying text (discussing the federal regulatory
framework).
12. 139 CONG. REC. S16,931 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993). Senator Moynihan recalled that
as a Naval officer in the 1940s, he was issued a Colt .45 caliber sidearm made in 1911.
See id. He has since noted that "[u]se of weapons 35 or even 50 years old has been
common in our Armed Forces." 141 CONG. REC. S3905 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1995); see
also, GEORGE D. NEWTON, JR. & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN
AMERICAN LiFE 3, 5 (1970) (noting that the usable life of a firearm is best measured by
the number of rounds it is able to fire, which for some is near 10,000).
13. See Guns in America; Home on the Range, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1994, at 23, 23.
14. See Brooks Egerton, In Connecticut's "Gun Valley", Industry Becomes the Focus
of Anti-Crime Debate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 6, 1994, at B4 (noting that Colt,
Winchester, Mossberg, Marlin, and Smith & Wesson manufacture within a short distance
of Hartford).
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the annual production of these companies were not compiled until
1973, when the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
("BATF") began to monitor production."5 There were estimates of
the size of the existing firearm market before BATF began to keep
its records. In a 1968 study conducted by the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, it was estimated that
there were 90 million firearms in circulation. 6
Approximately 4.5 million firearms were produced each year
between 1973 and 1994."7 During these years, the average annual
export rate was eight percent of domestic production, while imports
totaled almost 19 million.'8 These figures reveal that for that
twenty-one year period, a total of over 109 million firearms were
introduced into the domestic market. 9 Substituting average num-
bers for unreported years, and adding these to the tabulated
numbers and the 1968 study's numbers reveal that there are ap-
proximately 230 million firearms circulating in the domestic mar-
ket.2'
2. Distribution
The firearm distribution network has undergone significant
change since 1993. In 1994, one source reported that there were
284,000 licensed firearm retailers.' Only 20,000 of those had le-
gitimate stores, and half of those were pawn brokers.' The re-
15. See Ann Y. Smith, Industry in Review, SHOOTING INDUSTRY, Dec. 1992, at 102
(noting the BATF record keeping and the one-year delay in reporting these statistics); see
also Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms, 27 C.F.R. § 178.123 (1996) (containing the
current monitoring regulation).
16. See NEWTON & ZIMRING, supra note 12, at 6. Those researchers could do no
better than average an estimate of firearm ownership from opinion polls with a calculation
of firearms produced since 1899. They did take into account an estimation of military
issue firearms then in civilian hands and the likelihood of unreported imports. See id. at
6.
17. See Table 1. Domestic Firearm Market Analysis, infra p. 1024 [hereinafter Market
Analysis].
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Thus, 4,750,000 for the years 1969-1972, 1995-1996, for a total of 28,500,000. See
id.
21. See id. Again, this is only an estimate, as it relies on estimates for a number of
years and prior unsophisticated samplings. It also does not accurately account for obsoles-
cence, among other factors.
22. See Guns in America, supra note 13, at 23.
23. See id.
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maining dealers sold "guns out of car[s] ... over the kitchen
table, or at gun shows and flea markets."'24
Because of stricter licensing requirements, the number of feder-
ally licensed firearm distributors has decreased dramatically since
1993.2 By December of 1995 the number of licensed dealers had
shrunk to 120,000.26 That number is expected to continue to
shrink to between 20,000 and 24,000 by early 1997.27
The BATF estimates that 7.5 million new and used firearms
are sold at retail outlets each year. 8 A good percentage of the
nation's firearm supply is in circulation.2 9 A 1993 Department of
Justice survey revealed that one-half of American homes own a
firearm. 3' The average number of firearms in these homes is re-
ported to be 4.1.31 This percentage has remained relatively con-
stant since 1959.32
Firearms can be expensive. A Cleveland-area gun and tackle
shop listed the Smith & Wesson 640, a .357 Magnum revolver, at
$449.95.33 The Colt .45 ACP, a forty-five caliber semiautomatic
handgun, sells for $744.95, while the Taurus 85, a thirty-eight
caliber revolver, sells for $284.95. 4 The Remington 870 Express,
24. See id.
25. Three changes served to alter the landscape of firearms distribution: (1) President
Clinton's Executive Order of August 11, 1993, requiring additional paper-work, finger-
prints, and photographs to obtain a license; (2) implementation of the Brady Bill on No-
vember 29, 1993, with a $200 fee for a three-year license and a $90 fee for a three-year
extension; and (3) passage of the crime bill in September of 1994, which codified the
earlier executive order. See FFLs Plummet to 10-Year Low: Federal Firearm License,
SHOOTING INDUSTRY, Mar. 1995, at 10.
26. See id.
27. See id. (noting that for over 25 years there have been only 20,000 to 24,000 legit-
imate dealers, and that renewals have been averaging only 10%).
28. See Andrew D. Hera, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Derelic-
tion of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 59 n.4 (1995). This figure represents
a 10 year average of production (adjusted for imports and exports) plus used gun sales
(estimated at 50% of all sales); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 43,524 (1990).
29. See id., at 59.
30. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICIMIZA-
TION IN THE UNrED STATES (1993).
31. See Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. 59, 81 (1995).
32. See Kluin, supra note 10, at 255 n.96 (citing a 1959 Gallup Poll reporting that
49% of American households owned one or more firearms and a 1973 National Opinion
Research Center Poll reporting that 47% owned one or more).
33. Prices as listed on March 14, 1996 at Atlantic Gun & Tackle, 5425 Northflield
Road, Bedford, Ohio.
34. See id.
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a popular shotgun, lists for $259.00.35 Most rifles sell for around
$500.0.36
3. The Demand for Firearms
The demand for sporting-use firearms may be decreasing. In
1994, adults in twenty percent of American households identified
themselves as hunters, down from twenty-nine percent in 1977."7
Even with this decrease approximately seventeen million hunters
spent nearly ten billion dollars in 1992.3"
The euphoria within the firearm manufacturing industry in 1994
turned to jitters in 1995. 39 Industry experts reported that "[diuring
1993 and '94, the threat of gun bans drove the market as consum-
ers bought at a frenzied rate. With the November elections, con-
sumers no longer felt threatened and their buying motivation disap-
peared."
4
There may be truth to the assertion that the actions of the
federal government influence firearm sales. With the passage of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,41 fire-
arms loosely defined as assault weapons were banned from produc-
tion if they possessed certain physical characteristics.42 Rather
than stigmatizing the assault weapons already in circulation, the
ban succeeded in increasing demand. One gun dealer noted that the
"act did more to put more firearms out there on the streets, as far
as in the hands of citizens .... It was the best advertising cam-
paign you could imagine."'43
35. See id.
36. See id.; see also GUN DIGEST 1996 (Ken Warner ed., 1996) (listing prices for
various makes and models of firearms).
37. See Lori Montgomery, NRA Alters Aim, and its Targets, in a Slow Revolt, SEAT-
TLE TIMEs, May 21, 1995, at A3.
38. See Alan Farnham, A Bang That's Worth Ten Billion Bucks, FORTUNE, Mar. 9,
1992, at 80 (providing a general description of the hunting industry).
39. See Russ Thurman, Industry Suffers Sales Slump, SHOOTING INDUSTRY, May 1995,
at 62 (reporting sales 25% to 35% below projection).
40. Id.
41. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C
§§ 921(a)(30)(A)-(D), 922(v) (1994)).
42. See 18 U.S.C § 921(a).
43. 60 Minutes: What Assault Weapons Ban? (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 5, 1995);
see also David A. Markiewicz, Gun Ban Triggers Higher Prices, DETROIT NEws, Oct. 6,
1994, at El, El (quoting a gun retailer who noted that "people have been buying . . .
[assault weapons] up ever since it looked like the (crime) bill would pass").
9851997]
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Fear for personal safety at home and on the streets is a signifi-
cant factor influencing firearm demand.' That concern is intensi-
fied during and after periods of civil unrest. Gun sales surged
following the 1965 Watts riots and the 1967 Detroit riots45 In the
aftermath of the 1992 Los Angeles riots the buying behavior of
Californians reflected the mood nationwide as sales in that state
reached the highest rate in twenty years.4 Advertisements placed
by gun dealers and the NRA following the riots used that fear to
promote sales.47
Fear for personal safety is also a key factor in the emerging
concealed-carry movement.8 Several states have enacted statutes
permitting individuals to carry a concealed firearm.49 These stat-
utes usually provide that an individual must demonstrate a need
and that they do not have a criminal record or history of mental
illness."0 Individuals within the firearms industry have stated that
the concealed-carry movement is likely to enlarge the market for
firearms, particularly handguns. 5' This movement proceeds despite
44. See Mark Udulutch, Note, The Constitutional Implications of Gun Control and
Several Realistic Gun Control Proposals, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 21 n.14 (1989) (detail-
ing three advertisements placed by the National Rifle Association ("NRA") capitalizing on
fear of crime).
45. See Bogus, supra note 1, at 1365, 1386 n.148.
46. See Timothy Egan, After the Riots; Los Angeles Riots Spurring Big Rise in Sales
of Guns, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1992, at Al (noting the increased volume of sales in
California and other states); see also Market Analysis, infra p. 1024 (citing increased pro-
duction in the years following the riots).
47. See Erik Eckholm, The Riots Bring a Rush to Arm and New Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1992, § 4 at 18 (detailing advertisements placed by firearm distributors); Bogus,
supra note 1, at 1365 n.3 (detailing similar advertisements placed by the NRA).
48. See Thomas Hargrove, Focus on Stopping Violence, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Nov.
22, 1995, at A4 (detailing the "ight-to-carry reforms" movement led by the NRA and its
success during the 1995 legislative season).
49. Between 1985 and 1995, 20 states liberalized their concealed-carry permit systems.
See John C. Lenzen, Note, Liberalizing the Concealed Carry of Handguns by Qualified
Civilians: The Case for "Carry Reform," 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1503, 1504 n.4 (1995)
(listing 27 concealed-carry laws by state).
50. See e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, In Texas, Pistol Packers Must Know Psychology,
N.Y. T'md , Nov. 8, 1995, at Al (noting that in Texas a person must pay a $140 appli-
cation fee, have no history of a major crime or mental illness, demonstrate an understand-
ing of use-of-force laws, pass a shooting proficiency test, and pass a test covering nonvio-
lent, conflict resolution techniques).
51. See Thurman, supra note 39, at 62 (interviewing a gun wholesaler who notes that
"[a]s more states pass concealed-carry legislation, we'll see an increase in hand-gun sales.
In addition, the laws will make owning other types of guns more acceptable to a lot
more people'). Women have increasingly been targeted as an untapped market for fire-
arms. See Carrie Goerne, Gun Companies Target Women; Foes Call It "Marketing Fear,"
[Vol. 47:979
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the lack of definitive statistics on an armed citizenry's effect on
crime 2 and the ability of handgun owners to effectively fire their
weapons in defensive situations.53
B. Unintended Uses by Unintended Users
1. Children
Dr. Katherine Christoffel, a Chicago pediatrician and an advo-
cate of improved firearm safety, believes she can tell from the age
of a child admitted with a gunshot wound the general circumstanc-
es through which that wound was acquired.5" Dr. Christoffel's
experience shows that if a child is under the age of five, he ("[lIt
is almost always a he."55) will have found a gun at home or at
MARKETING NEWS, Aug. 31, 1992, at 1 (noting that in 1992 Ladies Home Journal was
the first general-interest women's magazine to accept a firearm advertisement, detailing the
LadySmith marketing campaign of Smith & Wesson, and the introduction of Women &
Guns magazine in 1989, with a 1992 circulation of 25,000).
52. See Vernon Silver, Holes Found in Law on Carrying Hidden Guns, N.Y. TWIES,
Nov. 2, 1995, at A16 (noting that gun homicide rates in several Florida metropolitan
areas increased after its legislature passed a concealed carry law). Phillip J. Cook, a pub-
lic policy professor at Duke University, has stated that
We're having a good natural experiment now with about half the states chang-
ing their laws. This is a fascinating issue because predictions [concerning ef-
fects on crime] go in both direcions.... . T]here is no firm evidence which
allows people to speculate freely.
Id.; see also A.L. Kellerman & D.T. Reay, Protection or Peril? An Analysis of Firearm
Related Deaths in the Home, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1557-1560 (1986) (finding
that for every act of self-protection there are 1.3 fatal accidental shootings, 5 homicides,
and 37 suicides).
53. Compare Kevin M. Cunningham, When Gun Control Meets the Constitution, 10 ST.
JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 59, 63 (1994) (citing 2.4 million defensive uses) with David
McDowall & Brian Wiersema, The Incidence of Defensive Firearms Use by US Crime
Victims, 1987-1990, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Dec. 1994, at 1983, 1984 (noting an annual
mean of 64,615 defensive uses of firearms from 1987-1990, but concluding that "criminals
face little threat from armed victims. The probability of firearm resistance is not zero.
Yet, given that half of US households own a gun, armed self-defense is extremely un-
common. Coupled with the risks of keeping a gun for protection, these results raise ques-
tions about the collective benefits of civilian firearm ownership... ") (footnotes omitted),
Thurman, supra note 39, at 62 ("[A]n incredible number of new gun owners have joined
our ranks during the past two years. Most of them have not handled firearms before ....
This translates into a chance for significant increases in accidental shootings.", and Kluin,
supra note 10, at 259 n.134 (discussing the difficulty of accurately firing a handgun).
54. See Children and Guns: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Children, Youth,
and Families House of Representatives, 101st Cong. 37, 38 (1989) (statement of Katherine
K. Christoffel M.D., F.A.A.P.) [hereinafter Children and Guns].
55. Id.
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the home of a friend and begun to explore, thinking it may be a
toy.56 If he is over age five "the story will be similar, except that
the handling of the gun will have been fantasy play.., just like
on TV.
''sT
Dr. Christoffel's experience reflects the norm, as the majority
of these accidental shootings occur when a child plays with a
loaded gun." From 1985 to 1990, between 87 and 128 children
under the age of ten died each year from accidental shootings.59
For the same years, an average of thirty-six children between the
ages of one and four died each year from unintentional firearm dis-
charges.6 For children ages five through nine, the average num-
ber of fatalities per year was fifty-eight.61
2. Adolescents
Dr. Christoffel's experience also indicates that if an adolescent
is admitted to her care with a firearm injury, the injury is likely to
be a suicide attempt or an assault.62 As children mature the types
of unintended uses of firearms broaden to encompass suicide and
violent crime as well as accidental shootings.
From 1985 to 1990, an average of 421 adolescents and teens
between the ages of ten and nineteen died each year from acciden-
tal firearm discharges.6' Accidental deaths were most common
within the fifteen through nineteen year-old age group, which aver-
aged 261 per year.' The average for the ten to fourteen year-old
age group was 161 per year.65 It has been estimated that for each
accidental firearm fatality there are nearly five injuries.6
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. See Eupil Choi et al., Deaths Due to Firearms Injuries in Children, J. OF FOREN-
SIC Sci., May 1994, at 685, 690.
59. See Table 2. Unintentional Firearm Fatalities, infra p. 1025 [hereinafter Unintended
Fatality Chart].
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Children and Guns, supra note 54 at 38.
63. See Unintended Fatality Chart, infra p. 1025.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Murray L. Katcher, Firearm Injuries Among Children and Adolescents: L The
Facts, 93 Wisc. MED. J. 511, 512 (1994).
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Since the enactment of The Gun Control Act of 1968, it has
been illegal to sell or transfer a firearm to a minor.67 Twenty-one
states have provisions explicitly prohibiting the possession of fire-
arms by juveniles. 6 During Senate testimony exploring the prob-
lem of children and weapons, Ronald Stephens, Executive Director
of the National School Safety Center, stated that the "primary
source of all weapons [is] the student's residence. 69 Mr. Stephens
detailed other illegal sources through which adolescents acquire
firearms, noting that in 1992 one student in Houston was running a
gun rental service7 °
Since 1992 the National School Safety Center has tracked 147
violent deaths in schools, 119 of them involving firearms.71 The
Center reported 46 violent deaths during the 1993-94 school year,
20 during the 1994-95 school year, and 26 at the mid-point of the
1995-96 school year.' Motives for possession may vary. One
study noted that adolescents may desire to possess a firearm for
status enhancement.7 3 That study concluded, however, that as gun
67. Pub. L. No. 90-354, 8 Stat. 162 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (1994)).
There are limited circumstances when juvenile possession is acceptable. See 18 U.S.C. §
922(x)(1)-(6) (1994).
68. See Brian R. Suffredini, Juvenile Gunslingers: A Place for Punitive Philosophy in
Rehabilitative Juvenile Justice, 35 B.C. L. REV. 885, 886 n.11, 904 (1994) (arguing that
despite state enactments "firearms will continue to be readily available to youths").
69. Children Carrying Weapons: Why the Recent Increase: Hearing on the Possession
of Weapons Among Children and the Presence of These Weapons in our Schools, Before
the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
70. See id. The problem of adolescent firearm possession in school, though generally
considered an urban problem, has also been shown to be serious in some suburbs. Com-
pare JOSEPH F. SHELEY & J. WRIGHT, NATIONAL INSTITtIrE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, GUN ACQUISITION AND POSSESSION IN SELECTED JUVENmE SAMPLES 5 (1993)
(finding that one in three male and one in ten female urban adolescents had carded a
firearm) and Charles M. Callahan & Frederick P. Rivara, Urban High School Youth and
Handguns: A School-Based Survey, 267 JAMA 3038, 3042 (1992) (finding that in a 1992
survey of high school juniors in Seattle, 34% reported easy access to a handgun and
6.4% reported handgun ownership) with Joseph F. Sheley & Victoria E. Brewer, Posses-
sion and Carrying of Firearms Among Suburban Youth, PUB. HEALTH REP., Jan.-Feb.
1995, at 24 (finding that one in five students in a suburban New Orleans high school
owned a handgun).
71. See Peter Applebome, Shootings at Schools Prompt New Concerns About Gun
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, § 1 at 12.
72. See id. (asserting that the decrease in 1994-95 was due to stricter federal guidelines
for possession of firearms in school).
73. See Sheley & Brewer, supra note 70, at 25.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
possession increases, more adolescents may wish to carry a firearm
for protection.74
Student firearm possession may vary depending on the local
environment for crime. In high crime areas, two in five students
report having carried a weapon for protection, while one in eight
have done so nationally.75 One in three students in high crime
areas reported cutting class because of fear, while one in nine did
so nationally.76
FBI statistics reveal that arrests of juveniles for weapon law
violations have increased dramatically since 1970.' 7 The arrest
figures for 1992 show a 151% increase since 1990, a 235% in-
crease since 1980, and a 291% increase since 1970.78 Over the
same twelve year period there was a 116% rise in the number of
violent crimes committed by juveniles.79 In 1970, 54,860 juveniles
were arrested for violent crimes.8° By 1992 that number had
grown to 118,334.81 A growing percentage of homicides commit-
ted by juveniles involve firearms. Rates of adolescent arrest for
murder when a firearm was involved increased seventy-nine percent
through the 1980s. 2 From 1987 to 1991 the juvenile arrest rate
for murders involving firearms increased by eighty-five percent. 3
Suicide rates within the ten to nineteen year-old age group
nearly doubled between 1970 and 1990.4 Although the number of
74. See id.
75. See Applebome, supra note 71, at 8.
76. See id.
77. The term "weapon law violations" refers to prohibited possession of a firearm. See
BUREAU OF CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 205, no. 316 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 DATA
BOOK]; see also Table 3. Juvenile Weapons Law Violations, infra p. 1025.
78. See id. This growth has taken place despite decreasing numbers of adolescents
within the general population. See Table 4. United States Population, infra p. 1026.
79. Violent crimes include murder, forcible rape, armed robbery, and aggravated assault.
See 1994 DATA BOOK, supra note 77, at no. 316.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Suffredini, supra note 68, at 898.
83. See id; see also Charles Marwick, A Public Health Approach to Making Guns
Safer, 273 JAMA 1743, 1748 (1995) (noting that between 1984 and 1993 firearm homi-
cides in males aged 15 to 19 years more than tripled).
84. Within the 10 to 14 year-old age group 0.6 per 100,000 committed suicide in
1970, 0.8 in 1980, and 1.5 in 1990. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES no. 137
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 DATA BOOK]. Among 15 to 19 year-olds, 5.9 per 100,000 com-
mitted suicide in 1970, 8.5 in 1980, and 11.1 in 1990. See 1994 DATA BOOK, supra note
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actual suicide attempts has not increased, the higher rates of com-
pleted suicides are due to the use of more lethal means.85 When
a firearm is the chosen method for a suicide attempt, there is a
ninety-one percent chance that the attempt will result in death.86
3. Criminal Use of Stolen Firearms
The lack of a uniform registration system also makes it diffi-
cult to determine the extent of criminal use of stolen firearms. The
FBI compiles national data from local law enforcement officials on
the value, not the quantity, of stolen firearms.87 By dividing the
total value of all firearms reported as stolen by an average gun
value, one report estimated that 458,475 firearms were stolen from
households in 1992.88 An estimated increase of eleven percent due
to thefts from commercial operations was added to that figure,
concluding that about 500,000 firearms were stolen in that year.89
Stolen firearms play a large role in criminal activity. In 1991
firearms were used in thirty-six percent of the more than two mil-
lion attempted and completed violent crimes." A sampling of ho-
micide statistics reveals that sixty-four percent of all homicides
involve a firearm.9 Twenty-five percent of all firearms used in
crime are stolen, many of them within less than six months. 2 In-
77 at 95, no. 127.
85. See Suicide Among Children, Adolescents, and Young Adults-United States, 1980-
1992, 274 JAMA 451 (1995) (noting that the Center for Disease Control ("CDC") has
identified "restricting access to highly lethal methods of suicide" as one of seven strate-
gies for reducing suicide among young persons).
FIIEAMI SUICIDES
A 2199 97 1 9 1 IM 21990
2D-14 139 141 22 1 25 139 142
1"9 1.17 12 .51 1 .129 122 I .242 2.33
See Fingerhut, supra note 58, at 13 [hereinafter Firearm Suicide Chart].
86. See Katcher, supra note 66, at 512.
87. See Cook et. al., supra note 31, at 81-82 (noting that many firearm thefts go
unreported as some individuals who possess a firearm are involved in illegal activity).
88. See id. The authors reinforced this estimate by multiplying the total number of
reported firearm thefts by the average number of firearms stolen per theft. See id.
89. See id.
90. These crimes include rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. 1993 DATA BOOK,
supra note 84, at no. 311.
91. This average was derived from homicide data for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1991, and
1992. See id.; 1994 DATA BOOK, supra note 77.
92. See Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common Law
Approach, 51 FORDHAm L. REv. 771, 785 n.86 (1983) (discussing personal injury claims
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terviews of prison inmates and juvenile detainees reveal that signif-
icant percentages of them stole their last firearm.93
4. Monetary Cost of Firearm Violence
The nature of the unintended uses detailed above makes a cost
assessment difficult. For the purposes of this argument, an estimate
of the cost of injuries resulting from unintended uses can be
gauged based on previously assessed costs for firearm injuries. The
cost of crimes committed by adolescents and the costs of the use
of stolen firearms by criminals are too difficult to ascertain and
will not be estimated. Thus, the figures estimated account for only
a portion of the total cost to American society of unintended uses
of firearms by unintended users.
A report prepared for the General Accounting Office estimated
that 65,000 people are treated every year for injuries resulting from
firearms.94 That report noted that the average lifetime cost of a
firearm injury is $53,831. 5 Injuries that do not require hospital-
ization cost $458, while injuries that do result in a hospital stay
cost $33,159. 96 Fatalities cost $373,520. 97
By comparing these costs with the numbers of deaths reported
above, it is possible to estimate some of the monetary costs. For
1985, the monetary cost for accidental firearm deaths of children
and adolescents was approximately $193 million.9 8 If there were
five times as many injuries that required hospitalization," those
costs would amount to nearly $85 million. For suicide among
adolescents,"° the cost in 1985 was nearly $470 million. Thus, in
1985, this limited range of unintended consequences amounted to
nearly $750 million in monetary costs. These numbers, of course,
against firearm manufacturers by victims of gun-related crimes).
93. See Cook, supra note 31, at 80 n.l1l.
94. See CONo. REC. S4854, S4855 (Mar. 1991).
95. See id. These numbers, compiled in 1985 dollars, include hospital and nursing
home care, physician and other professional medical services, drugs and appliances, reha-
bilitation, life years lost, and lost earnings including those for premature death.
96. See id
97. See id.
98. See Unintended Fatality Chart, infra p. 1025 (reporting 517 accidental deaths in
1985).
99. See Katcher, supra note 66, at 511.
100. See Firearm Suicide Chart, supra note 85 (reporting 1256 firearm suicides among
adolescents and teenagers in 1985).
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do not reflect the emotional costs associated with accidental firearm
deaths and violent crime.
C. Firearm Safety: The Current Environment
1. Industry Efforts: Existing Safety Measures
The idea of producing a child-proof firearm is more than a
century old. In 1884, Smith & Wesson designed a gun that became
known as "the lemon squeezer.... Its nickname is derived from
the grip of the gun, which had to be squeezed before the trigger
could be pulled. Young children were prevented from firing the
weapon because their hands are too small and weak to perform
both actions at once. Smith & Wesson continued to manufacture
the lemon squeezer until the 1930s, when it was discontinued for
lack of demand."°
Today, most firearms come equipped with a device called a
"safety," while some come equipped with more than one. °3 Safe-
ties are intended to reduce unintended discharges by providing a
manual trigger lock that can be turned off and on by the user.
Their design generally consists of a small lever or a button that
can be shifted from "on" to "off' by the user's thumb or foref'm-
ger.
Firearm owners can purchase additional add-on or containment
devices that contribute in varying degrees to the child-resistance,
personalization, and theft prevention of their weapons. Trigger
locks and gun safes are the primary devices sold by firearm retail-
ers.1°4 Industry experts report that a consumer generally wants to
know "which safety device will allow her immediate access to her
gun, and still keep the gun out of the hands of curious or criminal
hands. 1 °s
Trigger locks are inexpensive, and when used will generally
prevent accidental discharge but not theft. ' 6 One trigger lock
101. See Marwick, supra note 83, at 1748.
102. See Gene Fadness, Tougher Access to Guns Will Prevent Deaths, IDAHO FALLS
REGISTER, Aug. 24, 1993, at A9.
103. See GUN DIGEST, supra note 36 (providing illustrations of various gun makes and
models and the differing designs of their safeties).
104. See Lisa Parsons, Securing the Firearm: These Budget-Conscious Safety Devices
Can Prevent Disaster, SHOOTING INDUSTRY, July 1994, at 24.
105. Id.
106. See id.
1997]
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prevents trigger movement while providing a motion-sensitive
alarm. Another has two pieces that mount on either side of the
trigger guard that are locked into place with a heavy assembly
screw. 107
Large gun safes usually offer greater security, but may be cost
and size prohibitive. °8 For just under $1,000, the Cannon Model
23 weighs 450 pounds with space for more than a dozen long
guns. It is operated by a combination lock and key with a spy-
proof ring. Smaller lock boxes and trigger locks allow a more
limited measure of security at a lesser cost."o9 The typical lock
box offers a stainless steel exterior and a combination lock. Gener-
ally, small lock boxes "will not deter a burglar... or a deter-
mined child with tools.... [They are] designed to keep basically
good but curious kids from hurting themselves or others.""
Manufacturers have taken steps to increase safety awareness. In
1995, Remington committed one million dollars to several safety
programs."' One program entailed placing safety-related adver-
tisements in shooting magazines. Another involved production of a
safety video shipped free with every Remington firearm."' The
third project involved co-marketing a video entitled Shooting &
Hunting Safety-Play it Safe."
2. The State and Local Level
It is estimated that there are more than 20,000 firearm control
measures in existence at the stater, local, and federal levels."4
These regulations generally intend to distinguish between different
types of weapons and different types of people." 5 Thus, some of
107. See id. As one commentator notes, "The major drawback for most of these locking
devices is that the operator must keep the key handy, yet safe.... In the dark, under a
stressful situation, fumbling around for a key could take much too long" Id.
108. See id.
109. See Parsons, supra note 104, at 75 (noting that some of these can be purchased
for around $20).
110. Id. at 24.
111. See Russ Thurman, Industry Suffers Sales Slump, Manufacturer Sued, Hearings
Support Gun Rights, SHOOTING INDUSTRY, May 1995, at 62.
112. The video emphasizes firearm safety through owner responsibility. See id.
113. That video is intended to be sold to customers or used as a promotion in retail
stores. See id.
114. See Daniel J. French, Biting the Bullet: Shifting the Paradigm from Law Enforce-
ment to Epidemiology; A Public Health Approach to Firearm Violence in America, 45
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1073, 1077 (1995) (discussing gun violence as a public health crisis).
115. See Cook, supra note 31, at 65.
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the most dangerous weapons are banned from commerce while
individuals considered to be dangerous are prohibited from possess-
ing firearms." 6
State measures generally include licensing or permit require-
ments' 7 and possession restrictions,"' in addition to increased
criminal sanction for using a firearm in crime. Many municipalities
have chosen to ban the possession of semi-automatic firearms with-
in their boundaries," 9 or to impose liability on manufacturers of
certain weapons misused within their bounds. 2 Some state's leg-
islatures have chosen to impose criminal penalties for the negligent
storage of firearms.'
3. Federal Regulations
Federal firearm regulation is a twentieth century phenomena.
The Revenue Act of 1918 placed a ten percent federal excise tax
on firearms and ammunition."n Congress banned the sale of
handguns through the mail in 1927.1n In 1934 the National Fire-
arms Act made it difficult to acquire especially lethal types of fire-
arms. 24 The Act granted regulatory power to the Secretary of the
Treasury because of the link between these regulations and the
federal government's taxing authority."z Within the Treasury De-
partment, the BATF is responsible for enforcement of firearm
regulations.' 6
116. See id.
117. See id. at 66-68 (discussing in detail the North Carolina permit system).
118. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing state restrictions on posses-
sion by juveniles).
119. See Joseph P. Tartaro, The Great Assault Weapon Hoax, 20 DAYTON L. REv. 619,
620 n.2 (1995) (listing 18 municipalities with such bans).
120. See Ronald R. Ratton, Note, Corrective Justice and the D.C. Assault Weapon Lia-
bility Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 287, 306-07 (1993) (arguing that the D.C. Assault Weapon Liabili-
ty Act rests on an improper foundation).
121. See Ann-Marie White, Comment, A New Trend in Gun Control: Criminal Liability
for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1389, 1391 (1993) (discussing
whether the power to regulate the keeping, bearing, or storing of arms exists).
122. See French, supra note 114, at 1076. The tax was raised to 11% in 1941. Al-
though the tax on handguns was lowered to 10% in 1954, the rates have since gone un-
changed. In 1991, these taxes brought in $143 million, while in 1993 they brought in
$164 million. See id. at 1077-78.
123. See id. at 1079.
124. See id. at 1079 n.42.
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(18) (1995); see also Cunningham, supra note 53, at 67-68.
126. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Statement of Mission, Organization
and Functions, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,288 (1986). Author's note: a complete guide to current
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In 1938 the Federal Firearms Act required licensing of dealers,
banned sales to felons, and criminalized the transport of stolen
firearms. 7 Thirty years later Congress repealed the Federal Fire-
arms Act, broadening its regulation of firearms under the Gun
Control Act of 1968.22
The Gun Control Act of 1968 required that all distributors of
firearms or ammunition be federally licensed, establishing more
restrictive standards than those previously in place. The Act prohib-
ited interstate sale of handguns and long guns except under certain
conditions. It also set forth categories of persons to whom firearms
or ammunition could not be sold. It prohibited the import of non-
sporting firearms and established special penalties for the use of a
firearm during the commission of a federal crime. 129
Although hundreds of amendments to the Act have been pro-
posed since 1968,130 the first major change in federal firearm reg-
ulation was not enacted until November 30, 1993. That Act, The
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act..' ("Brady Bill"), was
considered a sea-change by gun control activists.3  The intent of
the Brady Bill was to further restrict the ability of criminals and
other prohibited individuals to purchase a handgun."' The Brady
Bill instituted a five-day waiting period between the time the indi-
vidual seeks to buy a firearm and the time the transaction is com-
pleted. During this time, law enforcement officials are required to
complete a "reasonable background check" of the potential purchas-
er.
134
Since the Brady Bill two notable firearms regulations were
presented in Congress. In addition to the proposal and passage of
federal regulations can be down-loaded from the BATF home page at
<http:llwww.ustreas.gov/treasury/bureausatf/atf.hnl>.
127. See French, supra note 114, at 1079 n.43.
128. See id. at 1079.
129. See id. at 1080.
130. See id. at 1080 n.50.
131. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
922 (1994)).
132. See Richard M. Aborn, The Battle Over the Brady Bill and the Future of Gun
Control Advocacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. LU. 417, 419-24 (1995) (discussing the current
state of gun control in the United States).
133. See id.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994). Prior to the passage of the Brady Bill, 22 states required
some form of background check for handgun purchasers. See Abom, supra note 132, at
418 n.11.
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the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and
its ban on assault weapons," 5 some members of Congress pro-
posed a sweeping overhaul of the federal regulatory framework via
The Gun Violence Prevention Act ("Brady Ir').16
Brady II was brought to the floor of the House and the Senate
as the Brady Bill was taking effect. 37 It proposed the implemen-
tation of a handgun registration and licensing system, a limitation
on the number of monthly purchases and the sizes of home arse-
nals, and the required storage of weapons away from juveniles. 3 '
It also proposed regulating safety in firearm design by mandating
child-resistance and other safety standards.139
4. The Common Law: Products Liability
The arena of products liability is governed by "three distinct
but overlapping theories of liability"--negligence, warranty, and
strict liability."4 Negligence applies to products as it does in the
usual tort law sense. 141 The Uniform Commercial Code establish-
135. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the act and its conse-
quences).
136. See 140 CONG. REC. S 2172, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1994) (con-
taining a statement by Senator Howard Metzenbaum).
137. See id. (statement of Senator Howard Metzenbaum).
138. See id. at S2173.
139. Section 402 of the Act stated that
It shall be unlawful for a person to manufacture or import a firearm that does
not have as an integral part a device or devices that-<A) prevent a child of
less than 7 years of age from discharging the firearm ... (B) prevent a fire-
arm that has a removable magazine from discharging when the magazine has
been removed; and (C) in the case of a handgun or other revolver, clearly
indicate whether the magazine or chamber contains a round of ammunition.
Id. at S2181.
140. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. Er. AL., THE TORTS PRocEss 561-62 (4th ed. 1994).
The theory of abnormally dangerous activity has also been litigated in the firearms con-
text. However, discussion of this theory will be avoided, to limit the context to that of
products liability. See Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics and Products Liability, 59 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1103, 1105 n.7 (1991) (restricting its discussion to products liability despite the
existence of cases concerning firearms and the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activity).
141. See HENDERSON, supra note 140, at 562. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo noted that
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger... If to the
element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by
persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective
of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it
carefully.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
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es three types of warranties: express warranties; " implied war-
ranties of merchantability;143 and implied warranties of fitness for
a particular purpose.'" Strict liability will apply to "[olne who
sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user."'45
Variations within the strict liability theory occur depending on
the type of defect alleged, be it a manufacturing defect, a design
defect, or a marketing defect. Manufacturing defects "are inadver-
tent imperfections that cause products to fail to perform their in-
tended functions."'" Design defects "are shared by each unit in
the product line, causing the products to be generally danger-
ous."'" Marketing defects "include failures to instruct regarding
proper product use and failures to warn of hidden dangers."'"
Liability for firearm manufacturers and retailers has been found
under all three theories. 49 However, three conceptual problems
arise when a plaintiff seeks a remedy under strict liability. First, is
there a defect when a firearm is performing as designed? Second,
is the person pulling the trigger responsible for the injury, or is the
manufacturer responsible? Third, is the victim protected, or only
the user of the firearm? 5' These conceptual problems have
142. Express warranties "are promises by the seller that the product will perform in a
certain manner." HENDERSON, supra note 140, at 566. See also U.C.C. § 2-313 (1995).
143. These are "implied-in-law obligations of the seller that his products are free of
defects and meet generalized standards of acceptability." HENDERSON, supra note 140, at
566. See also U.C.C. § 2-314.
144. These are "implied-in-law obligations that a product recommended by a knowledge-
able seller will meet special needs of the purchaser communicated to the seller at the
time of sale." HENDERSON, supra note 140, at 566; see also U.C.C. § 2-315.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). A product's condition is defec-
tive when the product "is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."
Id. cmL. g. The drafters of the Restatement noted that "[mI]any products cannot possibly
be made entirely safe for all consumption .... The article sold must be dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who pur-
chases it." Id. cmL. i.
146. HENDERSON, supra note 140, at 561.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Annotation, Products Liability: Firearms, Ammunition, and Chemical
Weapons, 15 A.L.R. 4TH 909, § 2(a) at 913 (1982) (noting that "the liability of a manu-
facturer, seller, or distributor of firearms, ammunition, and chemical weapons has been
determined under ordinary theories governing products liability").
150. See Bogus, supra note 1, at 1106.
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served to limit the success of claims brought for firearm accidents
involving a technically non-defective firearm.'
Advocates of more stringent requirements for firearms manufac-
turers have proposed a number of alternatives, including creating
strict liability for manufacturers of certain firearms frequently used
in crime,15 and strict liability for ammunition manufacturers.'53
151. See Annotation, supra note 149, at 913 (stating that "liability cannot be established
in the absence of proof that the product in question was defective when it left the
defendant's possession")
152. See Donna Morel, Bang! Bang! You're Liable! The Imposition of Strict Liability on
the Makers of Semi-Automatic Weapons, 3 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 263 (1992). In light of
the California prohibition on the sale, advertising, or possession of certain assault weap-
ons, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 12,280 (1995). A California Judge upheld claims of strict
liability and negligence against the manufacturer of a particular assault weapon. See In re
101 California Street, No. 959316 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Apr. 10, 1995) (explaining how a TEC-
9, manufactured by Navegar, Inc., had been used on July 1, 1993 by Gian Luigi Ferri to
kill seven and wound six in a San Francisco law office).
153. See, e.g., Wink, supra note 9, at 235 (arguing for the extension of strict liability
to ammunition manufacturers); see also Note, Absolute Liability for Ammunition Manufac-
turers, 108 H v. L. REv. 1679 (1995) (presenting the same argument).
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D. The Consumer Product Safety Commission
1. Rationale and Authority
The CPSA was signed into law on October 27, 1972.' It
was based primarily on the findings and recommendations of the
National Commission on Product Safety ("NCPS"). 155 The NCPS
found that industry self-regulation was inadequate and that consum-
er exposure to unreasonable hazards was excessive.156 It noted
that "competitive marketing imperatives are eye appeal and cost as
opposed to safety.' 5 7
Congress found it "self-evident that the public is entitled to
purchase products without subjecting themselves to unreasonable
risk of injury or death.', 5 ' To mitigate this unreasonable risk, the
CPSA created the Commission.1 59 The Commission was designed
to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of con-
sumer products, to develop uniform safety standards for consumer
products, to minimize conflicting state and local regulations, and to
promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention
of product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries."6
The Commission was given the ability to set product stan-
dards, 61 ban hazardous substances, 62 and recall products in-
154. Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
2051-84 (1994)).
155. See MICHAEL R. LEMOV, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION § 1.10, 1-14
(1981) (noting that the report and recommendations of the NCPS are "cited repeated-
ly. .. as authoritative legislative history" of the CPSA). The NCPS was established by
Congress in 1967 and asked to "conduct a comprehensive study and investigation of the
scope and adequacy of measures now employed to protect consumers against unreasonable
risk of injuries which may be caused by hazardous household products." HOWARD A.
HErPRON ET. AL., FEDERAL CONSUMER SAFETY LEGISLATION iii (1970) (quoting Pub. L.
No. 90-146 § 2(a) (1967)).
156. See LEMOV, supra note 155, § 1.09, 1-11. The NCPS report concluded that com-
mon law product liability was "unreliable in restraining product hazards. . . . [because] it
was concerned primarily with providing consumers with post-injury remedies." Id. at 1-12.
157. Id. To mitigate unreasonable hazards, the NCPS recommended that Congress ap-
point a consumer safety advocate and create an independent agency. The NCPS felt that
to be effective the agency should have the power to issue regulations and develop safety
standards, emphasizing prevention in advance. See id.
158. Id. § 2.06, 2-8 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1153, at 21). For Congressional findings, see
15 U.S.C. § 2051(a)(1)-(6) (1994).
159. See LEMOV, supra note 155, § 2.07, 2.10-11.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b).
161. See §§ 2056(a), 2058. Amendments passed in 1981 eliminated references to product
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volving substantial hazards.' 63 The CPSA gave Federal District
Courts broad judicial powers.'" Citizens could file suit if they
were an injured party or were interested in enforcing a stan-
dard. 65 The Commission also has broad authority over imports
and exports."6 Because overlapping state, federal, and local regu-
lations could be an impediment to the CPSA's effectiveness, Com-
mission regulations have preemptive authority. 67
The CPSA also provided the Commission with broad informa-
tion gathering powers. 68 The Commission's primary data source
is the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System
("NEISS"). 169 NEISS is the foundation of the National Injury In-
formation Clearinghouse created by section five of the CPSA.'7 °
The Clearinghouse is charged with conducting studies and investi-
gations of the physical and economic effects of product-related
injuries.' 7'
composition, contents, design, construction, finish, or packaging, thus limiting Commission
standards to labelling, warning, instruction or performance requirements. See Pub. L. No.
97-35 § 1202 95 Stat. 703, 703-04 (1981) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2056).
162. When products present an unreasonable risk of injury and when no feasible con-
sumer product safety standard under the act would adequately protect the public from
unreasonable risk of injury associated with the product, the CPSC may promulgate rules
declaring products banned hazardous products. See 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (1994).
163. When a product is found to have a "substantial product hazard," manufacturers,
distributors, or retailers must immediately inform the Commission. See § 2064(a)-(b). The
Commission may then require that the public be notified of the hazard as well as offered
a repair, replacement, or refund (at the company's option). See § 2064(c)-(d). The Com-
mission my seek an injunction while these proceedings are pending completion. See §§
2064(g).
164. Courts may issue injunctions against manufacture, sale, distribution of non-conform-
ing products, restrain any violation of the act, and hear all actions arising under the act.
Civil and criminal penalties include a penalty of $2000 per violation, not to exceed
$500,000 for any series of violations. After receiving notice from the CPSC, any knowing
or willful violation may receive a fine of up to $50,000 and/or one year in prison. See
§§ 2069(a)(1), 2070(a) & 2071(a)-(b).
165. See id. §§ 2072(a), 2073.
166. Products that fail to meet the applicable standards may not be imported or export-
ed. See id, § 2066(a).
167. See id. § 2075.
168. See id. § 2054.
169. LEMOV, supra note 155 at § 12.03, 12-4.
170. Id.
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 2054. The NEISS collects its data from 91 hospital emergency
rooms across the nation. It was not until June of 1992 that the NEISS began to track
firearm injuries in a cooperative effort with the CDC. See Joseph L. Annest et a, Na-
tional Estimates of Nonfatal Firearm-Related Injuries: Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg, 273
JAMA 1749 (1995). Because NEISS information is limited to injuries associated with
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2. Example: Cigarette Lighter Safety
In 1993 the Commission implemented a safety standard for
cigarette lighters.'72 The process that led to this standard began in
1985, when Diane Denton, a registered nurse practicing in a Louis-
ville, Kentucky children's hospital, petitioned the Commission
requesting that disposable butane lighters be made child-resis-
tant. At the time of the petition the Commission had informa-
tion indicating that 140 lives a year, 125 of those under age five,
were lost to fires started by children playing with cigarette light-
ers. 1
74
In 1986 and 1987 the Commission conducted field studies that
determined that ninety-six percent of the lighters involved in fires
were disposable butane lighters, and that most of the children start-
ing the fires were under age five. 75 In 1987 the Commission
conducted test studies to determine the child-resistance of existing
disposable cigarette lighters. 76 On December 31, 1987, the Com-
mission voted to grant the petition and posted an advanced notice
of proposed rule-making."7
The Commission then began to gather relevant product infor-
mation and coordinate a number of tests to determine baseline
acceptability standards. 78 Pursuant to its research, the Commis-
products, not necessarily causation, it has been suspect. However, the information has been
essential in establishing statistically valid national injury estimates. The CPSC relies heavi-
ly on this data in establishing its priorities. See LEMov, supra note 155, § 12.03, 12.05.
172. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1145.16, 1210 (1993).
173. See Safety Standard for Cigarette Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,557, 37,557 (1993).
174. See id. The Commission was unable to determine at that time whether children
under five were the principal operators of the cigarette lighters, what types of cigarette
lighters were involved, the patterns of behavior of children playing with lighters, or the
necessary changes that needed to be made to lighters to decrease the risk. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. The test involved panels of children to determine child resistance and pan-
els of adults to determine ease of operation by adults. lId
177. See id. The advanced notice of proposed rule-making ("ANPR") stated that the
Commission was considering a number of alternatives to improve cigarette lighter safety,
that the Commission would consider (1) establishing performance requirements, (2) the
possibility of changing the existing voluntary standard, and (3) warning label requirements.
See id. at 37,587-88. The Commission received 13 or more comments to the ANPR and
incorporated these comments into its analysis. See id at 37,588.
178. In particular, the Commission found that more than 600 million lighters were pur-
chased in 1991, that 95% of those were disposable cigarette lighters, that 29 million
households owned one or more working lighters, and that there are about 50 manufactur-
ers and importers of lighters in the United States. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 37,563-64. The
Commission determined that a lighter should be unable to be used by a child 85% of the
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sion published a proposed safety standard on February 16,
1993.179 The safety standard was enacted on June 12, 1993, to
take effect one year later.
80
3. Why Not Firearms?
Firearms are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission
by Section 3(1)(E) of the CPSA.18 1 William Kimble provides one
possible reason for this exclusion:
If the Commission had been unable to reduce the risk of
injury by the establishment of a safety standard, it could
have declared firearms to be banned hazardous products
and excluded them from the market entirely.... [I]t was
feared that including firearms . . . might run afoul of the
Second Amendment. 82
Michael Lemov notes that certain products, including firearms,
were excluded "on the grounds that they were 'now subject to
adequate Federal Safety regulation' [and that] Congress 'has yet to
determine' if they should 'be subjected to safety regulation of the
type envisioned in this bill.""'18
3
The result of this distinct treatment for firearms is that the
Commission, with its information gathering and performance regu-
lating abilities, is without power to respond to the dangers present-
ed by firearms as it does for other products. Meanwhile, the
BATF, the one agency with direct supervision over firearms, is
responsible only for the enforcement of existing regulations.184
time. See id. at 37,560.
179. See id. at 37,559. During the information gathering period, The Lighter Association,
Inc., an industry group, requested that the Commission adopt as a mandatory standard the
voluntary standard being developed by a Commission task group. The Association "en-
dorse[d] a mandatory standard because this would assure that all lighter manufacturers and
importers [would] . . . comply and because a mandatory federal standard would preempt
state-by-state regulations addressing the risk." Id. at 37,558.
180. See id.
181. This section excepts any article from the definition of "consumer product" if it is
subjected to the tax imposed by Internal Revenue Code § 4181. This is a tax imposed on
firearms, shells, and cartridges. See WilLiAM KMaBLE, FEmERAL CONSUMER PRODUCT
SAFETY ACT 57 (1975).
182. Id. at 58.
183. See LEMov, supra note 155, § 4.07, 4-13 n.1 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1153, at 27).
184. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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II. ARGUMENT
A. The Context and the Method
1. Context: Addressing the Nature of the Product
As consumer products, firearms have a unique standing within
the American marketplace. That standing is founded on the federal
and state constitutional provision of a "right of the people to keep
and bear Arms."'85 These provisions, interpreted as safeguards
against government tyranny, are reinforced by the public's desire to
possess weapons as a means of self-defense and to enjoy a way of
life characterized by the sporting use of firearms.'8 6
In a discussion of automobile safety regulation it was argued
that "[tihe private motor car is more than just another 'consumer
durable.' ... That the automobile was, and should be, preeminent-
ly a 'freedom machine' [is] not a notion easily tossed aside."' 87
To a similar extent a firearm is also valued as a "freedom ma-
chine." It is important, then, to be conscious of the values sur-
rounding firearms when structuring a regulatory response aimed at
reducing or eliminating the threat to public health that they present.
Gun control opponents tend to view any federal regulation as
proceeding farther down a slippery slope toward total destruction of
their rights. 8 By addressing only the specific nature of firearms
as a consumer product the threat to the public health can be miti-
gated while respecting the constitutional and cultural values that
185. U.S. CONST. amend. II.; see also David B. Kopel et al., A Tale of Three Cities:
The Right to Bear Arms in State Supreme Courts, 68 TEMPLE L. REv. 1177, 1180 n.13
(1995) (listing state constitutional right to bear arms provisions). A broad discussion of
the validity of the common interpretation of the Second Amendment is beyond the scope
of this Note. For a contemporary discussion compare Herz, supra note 28, at 61 (describ-
ing the "constitutional fish story told by the gun lobby, swallowed by the public, and
rarely challenged by politicians, the media, or legal scholars") with Cunningham, supra
note 53, at 60 (arguing that current firearm regulations are flawed policies that are not
grounded in the Constitution).
186. See e.g., Baer, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
187. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTo SAFETY ix
(1990) (arguing that auto safety advocates improperly defined the problem as an either-or
decision between treating the automobile as "(a) a public health menace, or (b) a techno-
logical embodiment of America's political freedom" and asserting that this mistake hin-
dered the success of automobile safety regulation).
188. See Cunningham, supra note 53 passim.
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surround firearms. If the public need for firearms is considered
while addressing the performance failures of the existing product
the "right to bear" is not infringed while the quality of what is
borne is enhanced.
In relation to the ability of unintended users to gain access to
firearms and put them to unintended use, it is clear that firearms,
as they are currently designed, are unsafe. Child-play becomes
injury and death.189 Adolescent immaturity, frustration, and dys-
function become arrest, assault, suicide, and homicide." ° A fire-
arm bought for protection or sport becomes a valued instrument for
the commission of crime.'91
Despite the proliferation of state, local, and federal firearms
regulations, their focus on distinguishing between dangerous weap-
ons and dangerous people' 92 has failed to protect innocent mem-
bers of society from ordinary firearms. Criminal sanction for the
negligent storage of firearms 93 is effective only to the extent that
it may convince other firearm owners to safely secure their weap-
ons. Despite being market-wide in scope, industry efforts to prevent
theft, to childproof, personalize, or to provide a safe firearm'94
have had limited success at preventing unintended misuse.
Various problems exist with the common law products liability
scheme as it applies to firearms. Civil liability offers only post-
injury remedies and enforces safety standards on manufacturers that
vary in effectiveness because they are limited by jurisdictional
bounds. The absence of federal standards may in fact weaken prod-
uct liability standards. 1
95
Should any state choose to enact mandatory performance stan-
dards, they would be limited in effectiveness by their narrow appli-
cation. The potential for an illegal gun trade from states without
such measures would also limit effectiveness. To force uniform
industry compliance with such a measure, a large number of states,
or a few very populous states, would have to implement similar
regulations.
189. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 62-86 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
193. See white, supra note 121.
194. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
195. See generally Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in
Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1121 (1988).
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The problems addressed above parallel the rationale for the
enactment of the CPSA.' 96 Furthermore, the regulatory model cre-
ated by the CPSA and utilized on products such as cigarette light-
ers exemplifies regulation at the federal level that is successful at
reducing risks associated with the nature of products as they are
designed. 197 By applying the CPSA model to firearms it is possi-
ble to envision a federally mandated performance standard that
addresses the unreasonable risk associated with firearms.
2. The Method: CPSA Scrutiny
The umbrella standard under which the Commission operates
specifies that all of its rules must be "reasonably necessary to
prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury."198 Prior to pro-
mulgating a standard the Commission must make "appropriate
findings," which include:
(1) the degree and nature of the risk of injury the rule is
designed to eliminate or reduce;
(2) the approximate number of consumer products, or types
or classes of consumer products, subject to the rule;
(3) the need of the public for the consumer products sub-
ject to the rule, and the rule's probable effect on the utili-
ty, cost, or availability of such products to meet that need;
(4) any means of achieving the objective of the order while
minimizing adverse effects on competition or disruption or
dislocation of manufacturing and other commercial practices
consistent with public health and safety;
(5) the rule's potential benefits and costs;
(6) any reasonable alternatives to the rule;
(7) significant issues raised by comments;
(8) that the rule (including its effective date) is reasonably
necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of
injury associated with the product;
(9) that the promulgation of the rule is in the public inter-
est;
196. See supra notes 154-71 and accompanying text (stating that the CPSA was created
in order to help protect the public against unreasonably harmful consumer products).
197. See supra notes 172-80 and accompanying text.
198. 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(I)-(3) (1994).
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(10) that no other standard would adequately protect the
public if the rule declares that the product is a banned
hazardous product;
(11) that if a voluntary safety standard has been adopted,
compliance with the voluntary standard will not be ade-
quate or there will not be substantial compliance with the
voluntary standard;
(12) the benefits of the rule bear a reasonable relationship
to its costs; and
(13) the rule imposes the least burdensome requirement
which prevents or adequately reduces the risk of injury for
which the rule is being promulgated. 99
These requirements create a thorough administrative procedure
and a detailed framework for analysis of the proposed firearm
standard.2
This analysis will introduce the requirements of the proposed
standard and suggest options for regulatory implementation and
enforcement within the federal framework. The proposed standard
will then be analyzed against the findings required by the CPSA.
Before concluding, the major challenges facing such a proposal
will be discussed in detail. Throughout the analysis the recent
development and implementation of the safety standard for cigarette
lighters will be utilized as analogous administrative precedent for
the development of a standard for firearms.
B. The Proposal: Command and Control
1. Detailing the Proposal
In stating the purpose and extent of application of the standard
for cigarette lighters, the Commission stated that "[t]hese require-
ments are intended to make the lighters resistant to successful
199. § 2058(f)(I)-(3).
200. Each of these requirements need not be explored for the purposes of this argument.
Considering that there are no issues raised by comments to this proposal, (7) need not be
considered. In that this proposal is intended to reduce loss of life and money, it is as-
sumed to be in the public interest, thus (9) will not be considered. In that this proposal
does not involve declaring firearms to be a banned hazardous substance, (10) will not be
considered. Also, in that there are no industry-wide voluntary standards, (11) will not be
considered. To avoid duplication of analysis, (5) and (12) will be considered together in
the cost-benefit section, as will (4), (6) and (13) in the analysis of alternatives. To simpli-
fy the analysis, (3) will be divided into two parts.
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operation by children younger than 5 years of age. This standard
applies to all disposable and novelty lighters.
20
'
The proposed safety standard for firearms has a singular pur-
pose that is achieved by linking two requirements. Its intent is to
reduce unintended uses of firearms by unintended users. The pro-
posed standard's requirements are intended to make all firearms
resistant to successful operation by children under age five and by
individuals who are not the legitimate owner or user.
To achieve these goals, it is necessary that the firearm safety
standard contain several performance requirements similar to those
created by the Commission for cigarette lighters.2" The proposed
standard would require that:
(a) The mechanism or system of a firearm that makes the
product resist successful operation by children must:
i. reset itself automatically after each operation of the
triggering mechanism of the firearm;
ii. not impair safe operation of the firearm when in
normal use;
iii. be effective for the expected life of the firearm;
iv. not be easily overridden or deactivated by a child
under the age of five; and
v. if tampered with, disable the firearm.
(b) The mechanism or system of a firearm that makes the
product resist successful operation by anyone who is not
the owner of the firearm must:
i. reset itself automatically when the firearm is reload-
ed;
ii. not impair. safe operation of the firearm when in
normal use;
iii. be effective for the expected life of the firearm;
iv. not be easily overridden or deactivated;
v. operate only one firearm;
201. 16 C.F.R. § 1210.1 (1993).
202. The cigarette lighter regulation requires that "(a) [the] lighter ... shall be resistant
to successful operation by at least 85 percent of the child-test panel. . .. (b) [t]he mech-
anism or system of a lighter .. . that makes the product resist successful operation by a
child must: (1) reset itself automatically after each operation . . . (2) not impair safe
operation of the lighter when used in a normal and convenient manner, (3) be effective
for the reasonably expected life of the lighter, and (4) not be easily overridden or deacti-
vated." § 1210.3.
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vi. not be easily discovered; and
vii. if tampered with, disable the firearm.
An example of how a modified handgun would perform under
this standard provides a mental image of what this proposal de-
mands. Modifications similar to those included in the lemon
squeezer may sufficiently childproof a handgun. 3 Added to
these modifications, however, would be some form of personaliza-
tion mechanism. This may consist of a simple key carried by the
owner that unlocks the triggering mechanism of the firearm. Thus,
to operate such a handgun the user would first have to unlock the
personalization mechanism, then apply sufficient pressure to the
child-resistance mechanism before pulling the trigger.
The necessity for each of the proposal's requirements deserves
explanation. Section (a)(i) is the most important as it provides for
a permanently child-resistant firearm. The mechanism must auto-
matically reset after each shot to eliminate the risk that the mecha-
nism can be left disengaged. Like the existing firearm "safe-
ties," such a risk would reduce the potential benefits of child-
resistance in that firearms would still be operable by children when
the mechanism is either intentionally or unintentionally left disen-
gaged.
The personalization mechanism, however, functions more like a
"safety." Section (b)(i) allows for uninterrupted use of the firearm
between reloading. Although this will result in a potential "off'
period for the personalization device, it is necessary for the proper
functioning of the firearm. The safest option is to require deactiva-
tion of the personalization device after every shot. This requires,
however, the repeated deactivation of the personalization mecha-
nism. Such a requirement would adversely affect the utility of a
firearm.
At the other extreme, the personalization mechanism could be
completely elective and only activated by the conscious decision of
the user. Like existing safeties, then, personalization would be only
an additional feature. Thus, by resetting at reloading or at the
user's election, practicality is balanced with safety. The mechanism
will allow the owner to keep a firearm for emergencies without
203. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing the function of the
lemon squeezer).
204. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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having to worry about disengaging the personalization mechanism.
If the firearm is stolen while the personalization mechanism is
deactivated it could be used, but only until it needed more ammu-
nition.
Sections (a)(ii) and (b)(ii) insure that the mechanisms do not
interfere with the intended use of the firearm. This is necessary to
insure that the modified firearms are safe for the user and still
function as desired. Sections (a)(iii) and (b)(iii) insure that both
mechanisms will last as long as the firearm. Sections (a)(iv) and
(b)(iv) make certain that neither mechanism can be bypassed by its
focus group. This is to prevent "hotwiring" of firearms, whereby
the safety devices could be permanently disengaged without affect-
ing the function of the firearm.
Section (b)(v) requires that the method for disengaging the
personalization mechanism must be effective only for one firearm.
This prevents the foreseeable circumstance in which the key for
one type of firearm unlocks all firearms of that type. Like a pad-
lock or the ignition of an automobile, this requirement mandates a
combination or key-specific firearm. The child-resistance section
does not have this requirement, as one method may be suited for
many types of firearms.
Section (b)(vi) requires that the method for disengaging the
personalization mechanism, be it a key or a combination, must be
difficult to obtain in the event that a firearm is stolen. A receipt,
registration, or some other proof of ownership are examples of
what can be required before a key copy or combination is issued.
Sections (a)(v) and (b)(vii) further guard against possible
"hotwiring" of a firearm by requiring that the triggering mechanism
be disabled if either mechanism is tampered with.20 5
2. Regulatory and Enforcement Alternatives
This proposal could be implemented in at least two ways.
Firearms could be brought into the jurisdiction of the Commission
with a proviso that they would not be labelled as barred hazardous
substances. This alternative was presented to Congress in 1991
within the Gun Safety Act.6 The Act was referred to the Com-
205. Certainly gunsmiths and manufacturers should have the ability to repair any broken
personalization mechanism. However, it is suggested that gunsmiths be required to obtain
proof of ownership before conducting any repair.
206. Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, S892, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.,
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mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, but was not
enacted. 7
The regulation of automobile safety provides another regulatory
model. Although automobiles in a generic sense are consumer
products, Congress regulates their safety through a distinct enti-
ty-The National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA"). Formed pursuant to the enactment of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,08 the NHTSA is a struc-
tural predecessor of the Commission.2' The NHTSA was re-
quired to establish "appropriate federal motor vehicle safety stan-
dards."21 It implemented a system of studying automobile acci-
dents and made it an offense to offer for sale or introduce into
interstate commerce any non-conforming vehicle.2 NHTSA stan-
dards were also to be minimum performance standards.2 12
Thus, at least two regulatory alternatives are available. Firearms
could be included in the multi-subject jurisdiction of the CPSA,
with limitations on the Commission preventing it from banning
firearms. On the other hand, a single-subject regulatory agency
similar to the NHTSA could be empowered with oversight of fire-
arm safety. The parallel structures of Commission and NHTSA
authority serve as an effective federal regulatory model for the
improvement of firearm safety.
C. CPSA: Required Findings
1. Degree and Nature of the Risk of Injury
The Commission noted that the cigarette lighter safety standard
was "designed to reduce the risk of death and injury from acciden-
137 Cong. Rec. S5854 (April 23, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum). A report
within that proposal contains a comprehensive study conducted by the General Accounting
Office of accidental firearm deaths and injuries and the relative reduction of these num-
hers that would be achieved by including child-resistance or load-indicating mechanisms.
See id.
207. See id.; Bill Tracking Report, 102d Congress, 1st Session, S 892 Gun Safety Act
of 1991.
208. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-727, 100 Stat. 941
(1994)).
209. See MASHAW & HARF'ST, supra note 187, at 4.
210. ld.
211. See id. at 48.
212. See id. at 47.
1 111997]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tal fires started by children playing with lighters. 2. 3 The Com-
mission cited the annual amount of property damage, the number
of lives lost, and the number of injuries caused by these fires.214
Injuries included thermal bums, anoxia, and others that were less
serious. 5 The Commission concluded that "[flires started by
young children (under age 5) are those which the standard would
be most effective at reducing.
2 16
The nature of the risk the proposed firearm safety standard
intends to reduce is the risk of death and injury from accidental
shootings caused by young children playing with firearms, the risk
created by the availability of firearms for accidental misuse or for
use in suicide and crime by adolescents, and the risk created by
the availability of stolen firearms for use in crime.
Roughly 500 children and teenagers die each year from acci-
dental firearm discharges, while perhaps five times that many are
injured.217 The annual suicide rate for adolescents is around
1,500, with the vast majority of these involving a firearm.21
Adolescent possession of firearms has also resulted in violent death
in schools, increased arrests for firearm possession, and increased
juvenile firearm homicide. 9 Approximately 500,000 firearms a
year are stolen in robberies of homes and commercial operations
and many of these are used in crime. 0 These unintended uses
by unintended users also result in hundreds of millions of dollars
of costs each year."
The degree to which these risks would be reduced will depend
on many factors. Modified firearms would initially compose only a
small percentage of the total firearm market.' Although the ini-
tial percentage of the total market occupied by the modified fire-
arms would be small, it would still represent millions of firearms.
Factored into this will be the effective success rate of the firearms
213. See Safety Standard for Cigarette Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,587, 37,587 (1993).
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. Id
217. See supra note 58-61 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 84-86 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
222. If the market average of 4.3 million modified firearms were to be introduced in
the first year, the number of safer firearms would represent less than 2% of the market.
1012 [V/ol. 47:979
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
designed under the specifications of this standard. Even assuming
that the child-resistant firearms, as with the cigarette lighters,
would have an eighty-five percent child-resistance rate, ' the
yearly reduction of death and injury would increase along with the
increasing percentage of safer firearms in the market. In time,
when the vast majority of firearms in the market are child-resistant,
the number of accidents involving children will begin to be re-
duced by up to eighty-five percent.
With the personalization mechanism the degree of reduction is
more difficult to estimate. If the mechanism were completely resis-
tant to use by anyone who does not possess the means for disen-
gaging it, then success will depend on such factors as the number
of times the device is activated between reloading, the difficulty of
acquiring the method for deactivation, in addition to the percentage
of the market held by the safer weapons. Again, the initial reduc-"
tion would be small. It would increase over time, however, with
the introduction of the safe firearms.
2. Number and Type of Consumer Products to be Regulated
The Commission noted that the cigarette lighter standard covers
"certain flame-producing devices... primarily intended for use in
lighting cigarettes and other smoking materials." 4 Lighters sub-
ject to the rule are gas- or liquid-fueled, mechanical or electric,
and of various physical configurations.'m Six hundred million are
sold each year, with 100 million in use at any given time. Ninety-
five percent are pocket-sized disposable butane lighters, while the
other five percent are mostly pocket-sized refillable butane light-
ers.tm Thirty million households have at least one, while owner-
ship of more than one is typical in most households, especially
those with smokers. 7
All types and classes of firearms produced after the implemen-
tation of the proposal would be subject to the performance stan-
dard. Depending on the market, anywhere from 3 to 5.7 million
firearms are produced each year, with an annual industry average
since 1973 of 4.5 million.'m In 1994, the most recent year with
223. See supra note 203.
224. See Safety Standard for Cigarette Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,587, 37,587 (1993).
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See Market Analysis, infra p. 1024.
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comprehensive production figures, domestic firearm manufacturers
produced almost 2.6 million handguns and approximately 2.5 mil-
lion rifles and shotguns.Y9 Half of all American households own
a firearm, with an average of 4.1 firearms in each of these
homes.3
3. Public Need for the Product
In analyzing the public need for cigarette lighters, the Commis-
sion noted that "[c]onsumers use lighters primarily to light smoking
materials.""1 It was also noted that lighters fulfill the same need
filled by matches, and that disposable butane lighters are the clos-
est substitute for matches because of their convenience and low
price3 2 The Commission found that since the 1960s lighters
have steadily replaced matches as the product preferred by Ameri-
can consumers.2
33
Legitimate consumer needs served by firearms include sport,
collection, and self-defense. For members of the public who own
firearms as a safeguard against government tyranny, there is no
substitute. Some sporting needs could be met by cross-bows or
non-powder firearms. It is unlikely, however, that the consumer
demand for firearms used in sport would be totally replaced. Simi-
larly, it is unlikely that consumers who choose firearms for self-
defense would choose to protect themselves instead with stun-guns,
pepper mace, or any other similar products. Firearms produced
under the proposed standard may be valued as much as collectibles
as those currently in production, thus that need will likely be unaf-
fected.
4. Effects of Proposed Standard
In addressing the effects of its standard on the utility of ciga-
rette lighters, the Commission noted that performance modifications
would require "additional-action switches, levers, or buttons, there-
by increasing the difficulty of product activation." '  The Com-
mission noted that, depending on the method chosen by the manu-
229. See id.
230. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
231. Safety Standard for Cigarette Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,587, 37,587 (1993).
232. See id.
233. See id. at 37,587-88.
234. See id. at 37,588.
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facturer, the result may be increased difficulty of use by
adults.235 This, it was noted, would reduce effectiveness of the
standard because some users would rely on matches instead.236 It
was also recognized that some types of lighters would be discon-
tinued.23
7
The Commission recognized that in order to implement the
mandated modifications, cigarette lighter manufacturers would be
faced with expenses in areas such as "research and development,
product redesign, tooling and assembly process changes, certifica-
tion and testing, and other administrative activities."238 It was es-
timated that "[t]otal per unit cost/production costs for the various
lighter types may increase by ... an average of less than 20 per-
cent."239 The Commission noted that these costs would be borne
by the manufacturer and passed off to the consumer in the form of
higher retail prices.24
Despite these problems, the Commission determined that the
cost increase would be well offset by the benefits, that a wide
range of lighters would still be available, and that those models
that were discontinued would not have a significant impact on
what is available to serve the consumer need.24'
The relative sophistication of the technology used to achieve
the proposed standard for firearms would have varying effects on
the utility that is necessary to meet the consumer need. The chal-
lenge for manufacturers will be to present a product that satisfies
the requirements of the proposed standard in a low-cost manner
and with as little effect on the utility of the weapon as possible.
Suggestions for low-tech personalization mechanisms include
combination or push-button locking devices,242  automatic
locks,243 or locks with keys. Low-tech child-resistance measures
235. See id. Anyone who has used a modified lighter understands the term "increased
difficulty."
236. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,587.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id at 37,588.
240. See id.
241. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 37,588.
242. See Sabra Chartrand, Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at C6 (reporting that two
Florida inventors have patented an owner-installed combination lock for handguns).
243. See Katherine Kaufer Christoffel, Toward Reducing Pediatric Injuries From Fire-
arms: Charting a Legislative and Regulatory Course, PEDIATRICS, Aug. 1991, at 294, 297-
99, 301 (proposing several measures including engineering modifications like muzzle ve-
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may include dual-action requirements such as those of the lemon
squeezer, built-in trigger guards suited for adult hands, or trigger-
pull requirements beyond the strength of children."
Suggestions for high-tech personalization devices have included
palm-print activation devices245 and computer chips or voice rec-
ognition devices.2 Similar measures could be implemented to
make the product child-resistant. Low-tech modifications would
certainly make the use of the firearm more cumbersome. High-tech
alterations may also decrease ease of use, but potentially to a lesser
extent.
The ease of use of firearms, however, is exactly the problem
that results in the unintended misuses documented above. If fire-
arms are made more cumbersome it is a sacrifice that must be
made to increase safety. This added difficulty should only be con-
sidered to the extent that it may render the firearm completely
unusable for its intended use. Leaving the design to the manufac-
turer will likely ensure that ease of use is a primary consideration
in the modification.
Regardless of the specific design modification chosen by manu-
facturers, the cost of producing firearms subject to this proposal
will be higher than those produced now. High-tech alternatives may
be simpler to use, but may prove to be too expensive for some
consumers.247 As with cigarette lighters, manufacturers' costs
would be passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail
prices. These increased per unit costs should be viewed as an inter-
nalization of the costs of lives lost and health care dollars spent
because of unintended consequences-albeit at a lesser rate.2 a
locity limits, loading indicators, and automatic trigger locks).
244. See id.
245. See Lea Sitton, Move Seeks to Regulate Gun as Consumer Product, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PIcAYUNE, May 8, 1994, at A7.
246. See Aborn, supra note 132, at 1221 (suggesting computer chip with a correspond-
ing encoded ring for the shooter).
247. See Sitton, supra note 245 (quoting a spokesman for Smith & Wesson who noted
that "requiring manufacturers to install high-tech safety features would price the product
out of the average gun owners reach").
248. Compare supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text (documenting some of the
costs for unintended uses in 1985) with infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the potential annual costs of a 20% increase in sales price per firearm). The cur-
rent federal tax on firearms, which brought in $164 million in 1992, also fails to com-
pensate for these costs. See French, supra note 114 at 1043.
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It is also likely that some firearms unable to incorporate these
modifications would be discontinued. Some handguns are dangerous
as manufactured because of delicate triggering mechanisms. 9
Nonetheless, a large variety of firearms will likely remain available
under the proposed safety standard.
5. Reasonable Necessity of the Standard
The Commission noted that research on cigarette lighters "dem-
onstrate[d] that lighters covered by the standard pose an unreason-
able risk of death and injury to consumers."as The Commission
allowed cigarette lighter manufacturers one year before the new
standard became effective. It did so to "provide manufacturers and
importers ... adequate time to design, produce, and market safer
lighters." '  Fearing that manufacturers would increase production
of cigarette lighters before the standard's effective date, the Com-
mission also provided a safeguard against stockpiling. 2
It would also be necessary to include such measures and safe-
guards within the proposed firearm safety standard. Design modifi-
cations and testing procedures of the magnitude required by the
proposed standard would certainly take time, as would refitting the
production process and marketing the safer firearms. Firearm manu-
facturers should be given sufficient time to carefully develop the
necessary modifications, implement the production changes, and
market the redesigned products to the public. This process could be
supplemented by cooperation in testing and design by the regulato-
ry body overseeing the standard's implementation. One year may
be adequate, but further study of the manufacturing process and the
needs of producers would be necessary to determine the effective
date.
Stockpiling should be guarded against in this proposal as well.
Firearm production statistics show production increases of approxi-
249. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 47 (1987) (discussing the delicate trigger
mechanism of the Hawes .22 Deputy Marshal, a handgun that "was defective and prone
to fire, when hit or dropped, without the trigger's being pulled"); Christopher D.
McKinney et al., Accidental Deaths Involving Derringer Handguns: A Report of Three
Cases, J. OF FORENSIC Sc, May 1990, at 730 (reporting three different cases where a
Derringer discharged when dropped, killing its owner).
250. See Safety Standard for Cigarette Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,557, 37,588 (1993).
251. Id.
252. See id. at 37,591. Manufacture or import of cigarette lighters could not exceed a
rate set by the standard. The stockpiling provision provided a rate set at a previous pro-
duction or importation baseline plus twenty percent. See id.
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mately two million firearms between 1992 and 1993.z5 Thus, the
potential exists for substantial increases in production in response
to a regulation such as this that would significantly alter the prod-
uct. If a comfortable baseline for production was established, per-
haps at industry average over the previous five or ten years, it
would prevent manufacturers from overproducing the more danger-
ous and less expensive firearms and adding these to the existing
supply.
The research conducted into the unintended uses of firearms by
unintended users documents the extent of the unreasonable risk
posed by firearms as they are currently designed. This risk parallels
that presented by other products before the enactment of the
CPSA.24 It is reasonable to assume that consumers are aware of
the risks associated with firearm ownership. These risks rise to the
level of unreasonableness as consumers may not be able to com-
prehend the damage done to society by the frequency and severity
of unintended misuses of firearms. Although the firearms industry
provides methods to cope with this risk in the form of add-on
trigger locks or gun safes, 5 these methods are not employed to
the extent needed to avoid significant costs to society. Consumers
may be willing to pay the price that would be associated with
reducing or eliminating the risk by adding child-resistance and
personalization features to firearms.
When a loaded firearm is left within reach of children, whether
or not its safety is engaged, there is little that stands in the way of
the risk being realized. If a firearm is not kept in a lock box or
guarded by a trigger lock, there is nothing in the design of a fire-
arm that prevents an adolescent or a thief from taking possession
of the weapon and putting it to ill use. These risks make it appar-
ent that it is reasonably necessary that firearms should have greater
safety included in their design.
253. See Market Analysis, infra p. 1024.
254. See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text. The NCPS, in discussing the con-
cept of unreasonable risk:
[S]uggested that even though a risk may be associated with the use of a partic-
ular product, it may still be unreasonable if 'consumers do not know that it
exists . . . are unable to estimate its frequency or severity . . . do not know
how to cope with it,' or if it can be reduced or eliminated at a price the con-
sumer is willing to pay.
LEMOv, supra note 155, § 1.09, at 1-12 to 1-13.
255. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
1018 [V/ol. 47:979
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFELY
6. Cost-Benefit
The Commission concluded that the benefit derived from the
cigarette lighter standard "strikes the most reasonable balance be-
tween risk reduction benefits and potential costs. ' 1 6 The Com-
mission estimated that the $385 million annual loss in lives, inju-
ries, and property would be reduced by $205-270 million, evidenc-
ing a net gain of between $115-180 after factoring in the increased
consumer cost.' 7 The Commission estimated that there would be
a fifteen to twenty percent per unit price increase for cigarette
lighters.z8 At that rate, it was estimated that the total annual in-
crease in cost to consumers would be $90 million, for less than a
$1 million cost per life saved. 9
It should be noted that the cost of creating that savings would
be born substantially by the consumers of cigarette lighters, those
benefitting from their ease of use. The same can be said of the
costs of the proposed firearm safety standard. Those bearing the
burden of the increased cost will be those benefitting from the use
of the product. In this way the regulation shifts the burden from
those affected by unintended use to those whose needs are served
by the product.
A cost-benefit analysis of a standard requiring personalization
and child-resistance of firearms is hindered by several variables.
These variables form a complex equation that defies any simple
explanation of costs and benefits. On the cost side, it is difficult to
determine how much the retail price of firearms would be in-
creased. It can be assumed that firearm manufacturers will likely
pass the increased prices of research, development, manufacture,
and marketing along to the consumer in the form of higher retail
prices. However, without further research into these costs, the best
that can be managed is only an estimate of the per unit percentage
increase.
Between 1973 and 1994 an average of 4.5 million firearms
were introduced into the market each year.' Using a price of
$500.00 per unit, which represents the median price of the hand-
256. See Safety Standard for Cigarette Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,557, 37,588 (1993).
257. See id.
258. See id. at 37,566.
259. See id. at 37,588.
260. See Market Analysis, infra p. 1024.
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gun, rifle, and shotgun prices cited above, 6' and an assumed
price increase of twenty percent,262 the increased cost to consum-
ers would be $430 million in an average year.
There are even more variables on the benefit side of the analy-
sis. The annual benefit to society will be measured by the effective
rate at which the design improvements reduce unintended misuses,
and the percentage of the market composed of these safer firearms.
This effective rate is the combined actual rates of reduction for the
child-proofing and personalization mechanisms. As noted, the actual
rate of reduction for the child-proofing mechanism may be fixed
(for example, at complete resistance to eighty-five percent of a
child test panel;2 63 while the actual rate of reduction for the per-
sonalization mechanism will largely depend on consumer behavior
(for example, modified firearms may be personalized forty percent
of the time). The percentage of the market occupied by the safer
firearms will depend on their annual sales and the amount of older
weapons removed from the supply.
The market percentage may be an unreliable variable as overall
benefit may be more accurately gauged by the percentage of house-
holds with safer weapons. If the fifty percent ownership rate re-
mains constant, as it has over the last forty years,2 4 then the saf-
er firearms will likely result in a growing percentage of safer
households. Some households, however, will be adding a safer
firearm to an arsenal of unsafe weapons. The new households that
choose as their first firearm a personalized and child-resistant fire-
arm, however, will have only safe firearms. Thus, the risk reduc-
tion in some households will be closer to the effective rate of the
safer firearms, while the risk reduction in others will be less signif-
icant.
The benefits to society would be measured by reducing the
annual cost to society of firearm violence, estimated in 1985 at
$750 million for some unintended uses,- 5 by the overall reduc-
tion rate. In an average year the increased consumer cost of $430
261. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
262. This percentage increase is not meant to imply that the cost of manufacturing safer
firearms will parallel that of manufacturing safer cigarette lighters. It is chosen only for
the sake of estimating increased costs.
263. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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million would be subtracted from the monetary benefit achieved by
the effective reduction rate to determine the net gain to society.
7. Alternatives
The Commission considered the merits of many alternative
solutions to the cigarette lighter problem throughout its decision
making process. It decided against allowing for a voluntary stan-
dard, worked to insure that the standard was the least burdensome
requirement on industry and consumers, studied different perfor-
mance and test requirements, considered different definitions for the
scope of the standard, and worked to minimize effects on competi-
tion and business practices.' The Commission incorporated some
alternatives into its standard and concluded that none of the other
alternatives "would have higher expected net benefits than the
[final] standard." 267
This analysis of alternatives to the personalization and child-
resistance standard will consist of a discussion of any reasonable
alternatives, and any alternative means of implementing the stan-
dard that minimizes effects on competition, manufacture, and com-
mercial practices. The analysis will also consider whether the rule
imposes the least burdensome requirement that adequately reduces
the risk.
One alternative to this proposal relates to scope. As presented,
this proposal covers all firearm makes, models, and classes. It is
necessary for this standard to cover all types of firearms in order
to achieve maximum effectiveness. While one type of firearm may
be less frequently misused in a particular manner, it may be more
frequently misused in another fashion. For example, the primary
weapon used in crime and suicide is the handgun.' Nonetheless,
shotguns and rifles still account for a significant percentage of
these misuses. Thus, the highest possible effective reduction rate of
unintended uses is achieved by including all types of firearms.
Another alternative in scope would be to require only one of
the safety features. Minimizing the effect of the proposed standard
to include only childproofing would certainly begin to reduce the
number of lost lives every year, but a vast number of unintended
uses would persist. By just personalizing firearms, many unintended
266. See Safety Standards for Cigarette Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,557, 37,588 (1993).
267. Id.
268. See Aborn, supra note 132, at 418.
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uses would be avoided, but the danger would still remain for chil-
dren who may gain access to firearms with the personalization
mechanism deactivated.
Additional features could be added to the standard to further
improve firearm safety. Requiring a load indicator would be anoth-
er method of reducing accidental deaths and injuries in adults. A
load indicator would make it clearly visible to the handler of the
firearm that the firearm is loaded. This alternative requirement was
presented to Congress as part of Brady II.269 The study conducted
for that act determined that load indicators may avert up to two-
thirds of all accidental firearm injuries and deaths, as many of
them occur when the user is not aware that the weapon is load-
ed.270
The proposed standard sets the child-resistance limit at five
years of age.27' This age was chosen in part because accidents
involving children that age or younger are a result of children
playing with weapons.272 In a recent study comparing the hand
strength of children to their mothers, it was found that at age five
children begin to develop more substantial strength.' The study
noted that the average handgun requires less than ten pounds of
pressure to pull its trigger.274 With children using two fingers and
their mothers using one, it was found that twenty-five percent of
three to four year-olds, seventy percent of five to six year-olds,
and ninety percent of seven to eight year-olds could operate a
trigger with ten pounds of resistance, while ninety five percent of
the mothers could do the same.275
Another factor in setting the five-year-old limit was the experi-
ence of the Commission in establishing the standard for cigarette
lighters. In doing so, they realized that the older the child is the
269. See supra note 139 (quoting specific language from the Act).
270. Id.
271. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
272. See Choi et al., note 58 and accompanying text.
273. Of the sixty-five handguns tested, 59 required less than 10 pounds of pressure, and
40 of these required less than 5 pounds. See Sara M. Naureckas et al., Children's and
Women's Ability to Fire Handguns, 149 ARCH. OF PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MED.,
1318, 1320 (1995).
274. See id.
275. See id. That study also noted that one objective in improving health for the nation
is working toward implementing fifty state laws that minimize the likelihood of firearm
discharge by children. See U.S. PuBLIc HEALTH SERVICE, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000: NA-
TIONAL HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION OBJECTIVES (1991).
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more difficult it is to create an effective child-resistance stan-
dard.276 Raising that age limit would necessarily increase the bur-
dens on manufacturers by requiring that the child-resistant devices
be more complicated. Conversely, lowering that standard would
likely fail to create significant benefits.2'
Should the child-resistance and personalization aspects of this
proposal be left to firearm manufacturers to conform with via a
voluntary standard, it is likely that the problems identified would
be similar to those noted by the Commission in relation to ciga-
rette lighter manufacturers. The Commission was primarily con-
cerned that the level of conformance with a voluntary standard
would be unacceptable.278 Even allowing for generous estimates
of industry compliance, the Commission noted that reliance on a
voluntary standard would not "adequately reduce the unreasonable
risk associated with lighters."2 9
It is important to consider the effects that a mandatory standard
would have on competition, manufacturing, and existing commer-
cial practices of firearm manufacturers. With a particular focus on
small businesses that would be affected by the cigarette lighter
standard,' 0 the Commission "adopted [alternatives] if they would
not reduce the expected annual net benefits of the rule."'" The
proposed standard for firearms would have a significant impact on
the existing manufacturing process, commercial practices, and com-
petitive nature of the industry. By creating the performance stan-
dards detailed above, but leaving the details of the modification to
the manufacturers, the incentive will be in place for manufacturers
to solve the problem at the least cost to themselves, and extending
that least-cost solution to consumers in the way of the minimum
increase in retail price. Different manufacturers could then develop
different solutions to the same problem, allowing for retail sales
competition to define what is the most desired modification by the
consumer.
276. See Safety Standard for Cigarette Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,557, 37,588 (1993).
277. See Unintended Fatality Chart, infra p. 1025 (noting the accidental fatalities and
the age at which they occur).
278. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 37,588.
279. Id.
280. See id. This focus is required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-
12 (1994).
281. 58 Fed. Reg. at 37,574.
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However, some manufacturers, especially the smaller firms,
would likely fall behind in such an open race. Because of this, the
implementation of the proposed standard should be conducted in
such a way so as to minimize the impact on the more sensitive
elements of the industry. Be it managed by the Commission or a
similar regulatory body, the transition would best be accomplished
by industry-administration cooperation. When it developed the stan-
dard for cigarette lighters, the Commission conducted all of the
testing needed to establish the standards. If one solution is found
that best satisfies the requirements of the standard, government
licensing of the successful design patent would minimize the im-
pact on small firearm manufacturers.
D. Addressing the Challenges
Several problems with the proposal remain that were not dis-
cussed in sufficient detail above. Primary among these is the prob-
lem of the approximately 230 million unsafe firearms already in
circulation. One commentator noted that "[i]mplicitly, any curb on
the production of weapons likely would prove fruitless as a short-
term solution to the supply of guns on the street." ' Similarly,
any improvement in the performance of firearms would be faced
by the challenge presented by the existing supply of firearms that
do not perform as safely. Assuming that obsolescence would have
a minimal effect on the existing supply of firearms, and that the
amount of firearms produced would reflect the recent industry
average, this proposal would result in a market composed of only
small percentage of safer firearms. With 230 million unsafe weap-
ons, less than two percent of the market would be composed of
safer firearms provided that the first year's production reflected the
industry average of 4.3 million.
One solution to this problem that is within the power of both
the Commission and the NTHSA is the product recall option. Such
an option creates problems like those faced by the drafters of the
CPSA when choosing to exempt firearms. Declaring all existing
firearms defective and subjecting them to a recall order would
result in enormous political and logistical problems. These prob-
lems would likely prove so significant as to make such an option
completely impracticable.
282. Cunningham, supra note 53, at 238 n.20.
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It would be better to provide for retro-fitting or destruction of
unsafe firearms at the election of the owner. Federal, state, or local
governments could provide for destruction of the more dangerous
weapons. Some municipalities have used gun buy-back programs,
with varying success, to remove weapons from circulation in an
effort to decrease crime. 3 Additionally, manufacturers and gun-
smiths could provide for the permanent addition of child-resistance
and personalization devices to previously manufactured weapons.
These approaches may hasten the removal of unsafe weapons from
the market.
The most practicable and workable long-term solution is to
create safer firearms and be patient. Considering the usable life of
a firearm,"8 it is likely that relying on obsolescence alone would
take anywhere from twenty to fifty years to reach a substantial
reduction of the volume of the more dangerous weapons. Consumer
behavior and incentive programs could accelerate this decrease.
Because an average of 4.3 million new firearms are produced every
year, the immediate impact of the introduction of safer firearms
would still be substantial. With the proposed standard in place,
time would be on the side of the safer firearms.
As mentioned above, there is the possibility that the safer
firearms would have a greater impact than is measured by their
market percentage. Because half of American households own a
firearm, and because that number has remained relatively constant,
some households would be adding a safer firearm to a collection of
unsafe firearms, while other households would possess only a safer
firearm. Potentially, then, the number of households owning an
unsafe firearm would remain the same, while the number of house-
holds owning safer firearms would increase over time.
Certainly, there are foreseeable problems with the consumer
reaction to firearms produced under the proposed standard. Dr.
Christoffel has noted that a sense of safety may breed careless-
ness. s5 Thus, the effective reduction rate of the safer firearms
283. See Ann Belser, Gun Buy-Back Program Begins, PrFSBURGH POST-GAzE-rE, Dec.
2, 1995, at C2; 9 Gun Buy-Back Sites Set in N.O., Jefferson, TI MS-PICAYUNE (New Or-
leans) Dec. 1, 1995, at B4; Ellen O'Brien, 352 Guns Turned in During '95 Buy-Back,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 1995, at 20.
284. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
285. Katherine Kaufer Christoffel, Toward Reducing Pediatric Injuries From Firearms:
Charting a Legislative and Regulatory Course, PEDIATRICS, Aug. 1991, at 294, 301 (not-
ing that people might become careless, thinling that they have "safe" guns).
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may be reduced by a greater number of consumers choosing to
leave their weapons loaded or otherwise relaxing their guard
around firearms. Consumers may also want to disengage both pro-
tective measures if they felt they were unnecessary. 2 6 Thus, the
requirement that the mechanisms be difficult or impossible to dis-
engage is essential.
The standard also provides that the personalization mechanism
can be left disengaged between reloading. While this is necessary
to allow for necessary functioning of the firearm during use, it
presents some problems. Although the child-resistant mechanism
should remain engaged after every use, children able to circumvent
the childproofimg feature would then have access to a firearm able
to discharge. Adolescents and criminals would certainly be able to
operate a weapon with the personalization feature left disengaged
and be able to use it until the ammunition runs out. Thus, the
proposed standard still requires consumers to use firearms in a
responsible fashion.
CONCLUSION
The place firearms occupy within the American marketplace, in
quantity, function, and mystique, has created a tragic and violent
conundrum. Any solution is likely to be complicated and problem-
atic. This proposed solution is no different. Firearms are a peculiar
consumer good in that they are specifically mentioned in the Con-
stitution, meet certain consumer needs for which they alone are
suitable, yet remain available for use by any individual for any
purpose. This peculiar nature results in a substantial and unreason-
able risk to the public health. A significant measure of this unrea-
sonable risk can be reduced by requiring that all firearms are child-
resistant and personalized. Mandatory performance requirements
may be a workable approach to improving firearm safety. By re-
specting the cultural values that surround firearms and the consum-
er needs satisfied by firearms, the CPSA approach allows consum-
ers to use firearms for their intended purpose albeit with potentially
greater difficulty. This approach, however, begins to eliminate the
numerous tragic deaths and injuries that result from firearm misuse
by children, adolescents and criminals. Obvious problems remain,
286. See Sitton, supra note 245 (interviewing an industry representative who stated that
consumers would always want to undo the mechanisms).
1026 [V/ol. 47:979
1997] CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 1027
but the nature and gravity of the tragedy that unfolds in our soci-
ety on a daily basis must be addressed. If not, we can expect more
of the same: child-play becomes death; adolescent depression and
dysfunction become suicide, homicide, and violent crime; easy
access becomes criminal use. The problem-solving model utilized
to great effect by the Commission presents one method of reducing
that damage.
JAMES T. DIXON
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TABLE 1. DOMESTIC FIREARM MARKEr ANALYSIS
YC~~~r]1~ 1 1 1 cd Elport apo o"
1973 1.734.154 1.836,730 1.271.428 4,842312 278.920 5.8% 859.0%0 5.422392
1974 1,714.989 2.104,650 1,803.240 5.622,879 336.685 6.0% 1.113.0D 6.399.194
1975 2.023.601 2.126.470 1.595,053 5.745.124 421.510 7.3% 793.60 6.116.614
1976 1.832785 2,112022 1.336.858 5,281,665 482608 9.1% 918,00 5.717.057
1977 1,879,645 1.932.773 1.225,043 5.037.461 555.480 11.0% 751.000 5.232.981
1978 1.877,077 1.787.591 1.195.876 4.860.554 541.422 11.1% 1.040.600 5.359,132
1979 2.124,280 1.876.470 1.319.510 5320.260 515,D9 9.7% 8868OD0 5.691.251
1980 2,369.643 1.936.078 1,339.410 5.645,131 517.374 9.2% 754,000 5.882.757
1981 2.537,229 1,680.945 1.155,567 5373.741 588.703 11.0% 690.000 5.475.088
1982 2.628.23 1.622890 878.568 5.130,081 445,621 8.7% 665.00 5,349.460
1983 1.966.836 1,109,830 959.663 4.036.329 793.106 19.6% 838,D0 4.081.223
1904 1580551 957.518 772,993 3.311.062 265.750 8.0% 774.680 3.819.312
1985 1550.071 1,140,669 769.505 3.460.245 183.461 5.3% 697.680 3.973.784
1986 1.427,627 970,541 641.482 3.039.650 216.714 7.1% 701.60 3.52-.936
1987 1.658,832 1.006.100 857.949 3.522.881 241.958 6.9% 1.064.000 4.344.923
1988 1.745.722 1,144,707 928.070 3.818.499 254,454 6.7% 1.277.000 4,841.045
1989 2.031,425 1.407.317 935,541 4374.283 259.303 5.9% 1.007.680 5.121.980
1990 1,838.895 1.156,213 948.948 3.844.056 353.927 9.2% 845,60 4335.129
1991 1.838.266 883.482 828.426 3.550.174 398.432 11.2% 1.009. 0 4,160.742
1992 1.525.218 676.808 805.761 3,007.787 295,370 9.8% 583.60 3,295.417
1993 2.655.478 1,171.872 1,148.939 4.976.044 412.942 8.3% *863200 5.427.102
1994 2581961 1.324.240 1 254.926 5.161.127 401,253 7.8% '863,200 5.626.291
43.122.908 131.95,916 23.872.756 98.2546 8.6 8.8% 18.00 41093,254
{AS [1.96D.132 1.452 996 j1.885.125 4.498.254 [398.036 8.8% 8328 =4.96,9.557
Sources: See Ann Y. Smith, Shooting Industry Market Trend Anal-
ysis, SHOOTING INDUSTRY, Dec. 1993 at 144; Russ Thurman, Fire-
arms Business Analysis, SHOOTING INDUsTRY, June 1996 at 54.
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TABLE 2. UNINTENTIONAL FIREARM FATALITIES
Age ][ 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 J 1990
1-4 41 31 36 41 38 31
5-9 58 97 66 51 59 56
10-14 177 143 144 185 172 146
15-19 241 238 220 266 294 305
Totals 517 509 466 543 563 538
Source: Lois A. FiNGERHUT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, FIREARM MORTALITY AMONG CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND
YOUNG ADULTS 1-34 YEARS OF AGE, TRENDS AND CURRENT
STATUS: UNITED STATES, 1985-1990, 13-14 (Mar. 23, 1993).
TABLE 3. JUVENILE WEAPONS LAW VIOLATIONS
Annual Violations Percent Increase from Prior Reading
Year Number 1970 1980 1990
1970 17,111 - - -
1980 21,203 124% -
1990 33,123 194% 156% -
1992 49,907 291% 235% 151%
Source: 1994 DATA BOOK, supra note 77, at 205, no. 316.
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TABLE 4. UNITED STATES POPULATION, IN THOUSANDS
Age 1970 1980 1985
All Ages 203,212 226,545 238,741
1-19 73,484 68,925 66,743
1-4 13,669 12,815 14,268
5-9 19,956 16,700 16,822
10-14 20,789 18,242 17,101
15-19 19,070 21,168 18,552
Source: Lois A. FINGERHUT & JOEL C. HEINMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, TRENDS AND CURRENT STATUS IN
CHILDHOOD MORTALITY, UNITED STATES 1900-1985, 1 (1989).
